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Forensic DNA profiling workshop
Forensic Bioinformatics 
(www.bioforensics.com)
Dan E. Krane, Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio
William C. Thompson, University of California, Irvine, CA
I:  Overview of what DNA tests can 
do for:
A. Prosecution
B. Defense
C. Post-conviction testing
DNA Technology in Court
• Criminal Prosecution
–Unprecedented sensitivity 
and specificity for typing 
biological samples
–Growing use of 
databanks and dragnets 
to identify suspects
–Rapidly becoming 
cheaper and faster
Possible DNA Sources 
DNA Technology in Court
• Criminal Defense
–Unprecedented 
sensitivity and 
specificity for 
typing 
biological 
samples
–Potential 
support for 
alternative 
theories of the 
case
DNA Technology in Court
• Post-conviction exonerations (208 in 
US) based on DNA evidence have 
revealed problems with the justice 
system
Sources of Error
• Saks & Koehler, 
Science (2005)
II:  The evolution of DNA technology
Three generations of DNA testing
DQ-alpha
TEST STRIP
Allele = BLUE DOT
RFLP
AUTORAD
Allele = BAND
Automated STR
ELECTROPHEROGRAM
Allele = PEAK
Two relatively new DNA tests
Mitochondrial DNA
mtDNA sequence
Sensitive but not 
discriminating
Y-STRs
Useful with mixtures
Paternally inherited
DNA in the Cell
Target Region for PCR
chromosome
nucleus
Double 
stranded DNA 
molecule
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DNA content of biological samples:
Type of sample Amount of DNA
Blood 30,000 ng/mL
stain 1 cm   in area 200 ng
stain 1 mm   in area 2 ng
Semen 250,000 ng/mL
Postcoital vaginal swab 0 - 3,000 ng
Hair
plucked
shed
1 - 750 ng/hair
1 - 12 ng/hair
Saliva
Urine
5,000 ng/mL
1 - 20 ng/mL
2
2
Basic terminology: Genetics
• DNA Polymorphism (“many forms”)
–Regions of DNA which differ from person 
to person
• Locus (plural = loci)
–Site or location on a chromosome
• Allele
–Different variants which can exist at a 
locus
• DNA Profile
–The combination of alleles for an 
individual
Basic terminology: Technology
• Amplification or PCR (Polymerase Chain 
Reaction)
–A technique for ‘replicating’ DNA in the 
laboratory (‘molecular Xeroxing’)
–Region to be amplified defined by 
PRIMERS
–Can be ‘color coded’
• Electrophoresis
–A technique for separating molecules 
according to their size 
Automated STR Test
Crime Scene Samples & 
Reference Samples
Differential extraction in sex 
assault cases separates out 
DNA from sperm cells
• Extract and purify DNA
Differential Extraction of Semen Stain
Female Extract Male Extract
Graphic from Inman & Rudin, An Introduction fo  Forensic DNA Analysis.  CRC Press.
Extract and Purify DNA
• Add primers and other reagents
PCR Amplification
Groups of amplified STR products are 
labeled with different colored dyes 
(blue, green, yellow)
• DNA regions flanked by 
primers are amplified
The ABI 310 Genetic Analyzer
ABI 310 Genetic Analyzer:
Capillary Electrophoresis
•Amplified STR DNA 
injected onto column
•Electric current 
applied
•DNA separated out by 
size:
– Large STRs travel 
slower
– Small STRs travel 
faster
•DNA pulled towards 
the positive electrode
•Color of STR detected 
and recorded as it 
passes the detector
Detector
Window
Profiler Plus: Raw data
D3 vWA FGA
D8 D21 D18
D5 D13 D7
Am
RAW DATA
PROCESSED DATA
•GENESCAN divides the raw 
data into a separate 
electropherogram for each 
color:
•Blue
•Green
•Yellow
•Red
•GENOTYPER identifies the 
different loci and makes 
the allele calls
•The type of this sample is:
–D3: 16, 17
–vWA: 15, 15
–FGA: 21,23
–Amelogenin: X, Y
–D8: 16, 16
–D21: 28, 29
–D18: 14, 19
–D5: 8, 12
–D13: 11, 13
–D7: 10 10
STR
• Short tandem repeat
• Describes a type of DNA polymorphism in 
which:
– a DNA sequence repeats
– over and over again
– and has a short (usually 4 base pair) 
repeat unit
• A length polymorphism -- alleles differ in their 
length
5 repeats: AATG AATG AATG AATG AATG
6 repeats: AATG AATG AATG AATG AATG AATG
4 repeats: AATG AATG AATG AATG
3 repeats: AATG AATG AATG
Reading an electropherogram
Peaks correspond to alleles 
Electropherogram
D3 vWA FGA
D8 D21 D18
D5 D13 D7
BLUE
GREEN
YELLOW
RED
AmelogeninAmelogenin
XX = female
XY = male
75 100 139
150
160
200 245 300 bpsRed = ROX size standard
Reading an electropherogram
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NUMBER OF PEAKS
– 1 peak = homozygous
– 2 peaks = heterozygous
– 3 or more peaks = 
mixed sample (?)
POSITION OF PEAK
– Smaller alleles on left
– Larger alleles on right
HEIGHT OF PEAK
– Proportional to amount 
of allele (approx)
D3S1358 FGAvWA
AMEL D8S1179 D21S11 D18S51
D5S818 D13S317 D7S820
Profiler Plus
SGM+
D3S1358 vWA D16S539 D2S1338
AMEL D8S1179 D21S11 D18S51
D19S433 THO1 FGA
Statistical estimates: the product rule
0.222 x 0.222 x 2
= 0.1
Statistical estimates: the product rule
= 0.1
1 in 79,531,528,960,000,000
1 in 80 quadrillion
1 in 10 1 in 111 1 in 20
1 in 22,200
x x
1 in 100 1 in 14 1 in 81
1 in 113,400
x x
1 in 116 1 in 17 1 in 16
1 in 31,552
x x
What more is there to say after you 
have said: “The chance of a 
coincidental match is one in 80 
quadrillion?”
What more is there to say after you 
have said: “The chance of a 
coincidental match is one in 80 
quadrillion?”
• Two samples really do have the same 
source
• Samples match coincidentally
• An error has occurred
The Debate Over Statistics
• Initial assumptions of statistical 
independence
• Were challenged by academic experts and 
National Research Council (1992)
• Creating a controversy that led some 
courts to exclude DNA evidence under the 
Frye (general acceptance) standard
• The controversy prompted validation 
research and improved methods 
• That were endorsed by the NRC (1996)
Statistical Fallacies
• The “prosecutor’s fallacy”
–Equates frequency of matching DNA 
profile with probability suspect is “not 
the source” or probability “someone 
else” is the source 
• The “defense attorney’s fallacy”
–Assumes probability of guilt is 1/m, 
where m is number of matching 
profiles in some population
Coincidence or Crime?
• SF Chronicle Headline, Dec 12, 2002: Double 
lottery winners beat odds of 1 in 
24,000,000,000,000
“…they won the jackpot -- not once, but twice, 
on the same day. An hour after winning 
$126,000 in the Fantasy Five game, they won 
$17 million in SuperLotto Plus. 
That's never been done before, lottery officials 
said Wednesday, maybe because the odds of 
its happening are 1 in 24 trillion -- which is a 
24 followed by 12 zeros.”
• Does this episode prove the California lottery is 
a fraud?
Important terminology
• Frequency (F)—
– the rate at which a profile occurs in 
some population
–E.g., the frequency of this DNA profile 
among US Caucasians is 1 in 1 billion
• Random Match Probability (RMP)—
–The chance that a randomly chosen, 
unrelated individual would have the 
same DNA profile as the evidence
–RMP is what the jury needs to know
–RMP is not necessarily the same as F
More terminology
• Single-Opportunity Search
– Comparison process where there is one 
opportunity for a coincidental match
– E.g., what is the probability you will share my 
birthday?  
• F = 1/365
• RMP = 1/365
– For a single opportunity search RMP = F
• Multiple-Opportunity Search
– Comparison process where there is more than 
one opportunity for a coincidental match
– E.g., What is the probability someone in the 
room will share my birthday?
– F = 1/365
– RMP = 1-(1-F)N where N=number in the room
Even more terminology
• Birthday Problem
–Multiple opportunities for a multiple 
opportunity search
–What is the probability that any two 
people in the room will share a 
birthday? 
• F = 1/365
• RMP > 1/2 when N>22; approaches certainty when 
N>60
Database Searches and the 
Birthday Problem
• Suppose the probability of a random 
match between any two DNA profiles is 
between 1 in 10 billion and 1 in 1 trillion
• What is the probability of finding a 
match between two such profiles in a 
database of:
–1,000
–100,000
–1,000,000
Approximate likelihood of finding a 
matching pair of DNA profiles in a 
database of unrelated individuals
Database 
Size
1 in
10 billion
1 in 
100 billion
1 in 
1 trillion
1000 1 in 20,000 1 in 200,000 1 in 2 million
10,000 1 in 200 1 in 2000 1 in 20,000
100,000 1 in 2.5 1 in 20 1 in 200
1,000,000 1 in 1 1 in 1 1 in 2.5
Profile Frequency
Last bit of terminology
• Ascertainment Bias
– The elevated probability of a coincidental 
match in a multiple-opportunity search
– Error arising from assuming RMP=F where a 
multiple-opportunity search makes RMP<F
• Key Issues for DNA Evidence
– Is a database search a multiple-opportunity 
search?
– If so, how to deal with ascertainment bias 
when characterizing the evidentiary value of a 
cold hit?
Cold Hit Statistics
• NRC I—test additional loci and report F for 
those loci only
–Presumes ascertainment bias is a 
serious problem
• NRC II—report FxN, where N is the 
number of profiles in the database
–e.g., if F=1 in 1 billion; N=1 million; 
then tell jury RMP=1 in 1000 
• Friedman, Balding, Donnelly, Weir (and 
prosecutors everywhere)—ascertainment 
bias is not a problem, so just tell the jury 
F
Balding/Donnelly Position
• A DNA database search is not a multiple-
opportunity search, it is a multitude of 
single-opportunity searches
• Although there are multiple opportunities 
to match someone, there is only a single 
opportunity to match your client, 
therefore RMP=F for the defendant
• Is this position generally accepted?
• What is the relevant question?
Problems with Balding/Donnelly Position
• Some database searches do create 
multiple opportunities to incriminate the 
same person
–e.g., suspect’s profile searched against 
multiple items of evidence from multiple 
unsolved crimes
• B/D assume probability of guilt in a cold 
hit case may be low, notwithstanding tiny 
value of F, because prior probability is low
–Will jurors understand (and share) this 
assumption?
• Failure to consider probability of error
The False Positive Fallacy
“If the probability of a false positive is one in 
a thousand that means there are 999 
chances in 1000 we have the right guy.”
• Not necessarily true; probability of “having 
right guy” depends on strength of all the 
evidence
• If prior odds of guilt are 1:1000 and odds of a 
false positive are 1:1000, then chances of 
“having the right guy” are 50:50 (even odds)
– See, Thompson, Taroni & Aitken, JFS, 2003.
Inadvertent Transfer of DNA
• Primary transfer -- from individual to an 
object or another person
– R. van Oorschot & M. Jones, DNA fingerprints from 
fingerprints. Nature, 387: 767 (1997).
• Secondary transfer -- from the point of 
primary transfer to a second object or person 
– “…in some cases, material from which 
DNA can be retrieved is transferred from 
object to hand.”  Id.
Quantities of DNA
• Optimum amount of template: 0.5 to 2.0 
ng
• 6 to 7 pg of DNA in each diploid human 
cell
• Our bodies are made of many billions if 
not trillions of cells
• pg = picogram (milligram, microgram, 
nanogram, picogram)
• SGM+ and Profiler Plus test kits are 
designed to fail with less than 100 pg to 
minimize these problems
DNA content of biological samples:
Type of sample Amount of DNA
Blood 30,000 ng/mL
stain 1 cm   in area 200 ng
stain 1 mm   in area 2 ng
Semen 250,000 ng/mL
Postcoital vaginal swab 0 - 3,000 ng
Hair
plucked
shed
1 - 750 ng/hair
1 - 12 ng/hair
Saliva
Urine
5,000 ng/mL
1 - 20 ng/mL
2
2
Taylor & Johnson Studies (1)
A kisses B on cheek
C touches B’s cheek with a glove
DNA consistent with A and B found on 
glove
Taylor & Johnson Studies (2)
A wipes his own face with a damp towel
B wipes her face with same towel
C touches B’s face with glove
DNA consistent with A and B found on glove
Pennsylvania v. McNeil
• Woman abducted on street and raped 
by a stranger wearing a mask
• McNeil lives in the neighborhood
• Laboratory reports DNA matching his 
profile in vaginal swab, cervical swab 
and semen stain on victim’s panties

9/24/99 Conclusion:
2/7/00 Conclusion:
9/24/99
2/7/00
Documenting errors:
DNA Advisory Board Quality Assurance Standards 
for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories, Standard 
14
[Forensic DNA laboratories must] “follow 
procedures for corrective action whenever 
proficiency testing discrepancies and/or 
casework errors are detected” [and] “shall 
maintain documentation for the corrective 
action.”
Documenting errors
Cross contamination:
Documenting errors
Positive result in negative control:
Documenting errors
Positive result in negative control, due to 
tube swap:
Documenting errors
Analyst contamination:
Documenting errors
Separate samples combined in one tube . . . .
Documenting errors
Separate samples combined in one tube . . . .
. . . . leading to corrective action:
Samples mixed up
Documenting errors
Documenting errors
Suspect doesn’t match himself . . . .
. . . . but then, staff is “‘always’ getting 
people’s names wrong”:
LOOKING AT A DNA REPORT
Components of a DNA report
• The samples tested
–Evidence samples (crime scene)
–Reference samples (defendant, 
suspect)
• The lab doing the testing
• The test used:
–SGM+, Profiler Plus, Cofiler, 
Identifiler, mtDNA
• The analyst who did the testing
• Results and conclusions:
–Table of alleles
–Narrative conclusions
Table of alleles
• Some labs include more information than others
• Usually includes information about mixed samples
• May also include:
– Indication of low level results
– Indication of results not reported
– Relative amounts of different alleles (in mixed 
samples)
• No standard format
Narrative conclusions
• Indicates which samples match
• Includes a statistical estimate
• Identifies samples as mixed
• May include an ‘identity statement’ i.e., samples are from the 
same source to a scientific degree of certainty (FBI)
• May allude to problems (e.g. interpretative ambiguity, 
contamination)
Looking beneath the report
The science of DNA profiling is 
sound.
But, not all of DNA profiling is 
science.
Sources of ambiguity in STR 
interpretation
• Degradation
• Allelic dropout
• False peaks
• Mixtures
• Accounting for relatives
• Threshold issues -- marginal 
samples
Degradation
• When biological samples are exposed to adverse 
environmental conditions, they can become degraded
– Warm, moist, sunlight, time
• Degradation breaks the DNA at random
• Larger amplified regions are affected first
• Classic ‘ski-slope’ electropherogram
• Peaks on the right lower than peaks on the left
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Sources of ambiguity in STR 
interpretation
• Degradation
• Allelic dropout
• False peaks
• Mixtures
• Accounting for relatives
• Threshold issues -- marginal 
samples
Allelic Dropout
• Peaks in evidence samples all very low
– Mostly below 150 rfu
• Peaks in reference sample much higher
– All well above 800 rfu
• At D13S817:
– Reference sample: 8, 14 
– Evidence sample: 8, 8
• 14 allele has dropped out -- or has it?
• Tend to see with ‘marginal samples’
1500
Evidence sample
Reference sample
150
?
Sources of ambiguity in STR 
interpretation
• Degradation
• Allelic dropout
• False peaks
• Mixtures
• Accounting for relatives
• Threshold issues -- marginal 
samples
Not all signal comes from DNA 
associated with an evidence sample
• Stutter peaks
• Pull-up (bleed through)
• Spikes and blobs
Stutter peaks
Pull-up (and software differences)
Advanced Classic
Spikes and blobs
• 89 samples (references, pos controls, neg controls)
• 1010 “good” peaks
• 55 peaks associated with 24 spike events
• 95% boundaries shown
0
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Sources of ambiguity in STR 
interpretation
• Degradation
• Allelic dropout
• False peaks
• Mixtures
• Accounting for relatives
• Threshold issues -- marginal 
samples
Mixed DNA samples
QuickTime™ and a
Photo - JPEG decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
Mixtures
• More than two alleles at a locus may indicate a mixture
• Number of contributors often unclear because of sharing 
alleles
• Some labs rely on ‘peak height ratio’ to pair peaks up (one 
peak 70% of another peak)
• May be arbitrary: factors other than the quantity of DNA can 
effect peak height
• Statistics used in mixture cases: may make debatable 
assumptions
PAIR? PAIR?
?
1
2
3
79% 69%
How many contributors to a mixture if 
analysts can discard a locus?
?
Maximum # of 
alleles observed in 
a 3-person mixture # of occurrences Percent of cases
2 0 0.00
3 78 0.00
4 4,967,034 3.39
5 93,037,010 63.49
6 48,532,037 33.12
There are 146,536,159 possible different 3-person mixtures of the 959 
individuals in the FB I database (Paoletti et al., November 2005 JFS).
3,398
7,274,823
112,469,398
26,788,540
0.00
4.96
76.75
18.28
How many contributors to a mixture if 
analysts can discard a locus?
?
Maximum # of 
alleles observed in 
a 3-person mixture # of occurrences Percent of cases
2 0 0.00
3 310 0.00
4 2,498,139 5.53
5 29,938,777 66.32
6 12,702,670 28.14
There are 45,139,896 possible different 3-person mixtures of the 648 
individuals in the MN BCI database (genotyped at only 12 loci).
8,151
1,526,550
32,078,976
11,526,219
0.02
3.38
71.07
25.53
How many contributors to a mixture?
Maximum # of 
alleles observed in 
a 4-person mixture # of occurrences Percent of cases
4 13,480 0.02
5 8,596,320 15.03
6 35,068,040 61.30
7 12,637,101 22.09
8 896,435 1.57
There are 57,211,376 possible different 4-way mixtures of the 194 
individuals in the FB I Caucasian database (Paoletti et al., November 2005 
JFS).  (35,022,142,001 4-person mixtures with 959 individuals.)
Sources of ambiguity in STR 
interpretation
• Degradation
• Allelic dropout
• False peaks
• Mixtures
• Accounting for relatives
• Threshold issues -- marginal 
samples
What contributes to overlapping 
alleles between individuals?
• Identity by state
-- many loci have a small number of detectable 
alleles (only 6 for TPOX and 7 for D13, D5, D3 and 
TH01)
-- some alleles at some loci are relatively common
• Identity by descent
-- relatives are more likely to share alleles than 
unrelated individuals
-- perfect 13 locus matches between siblings occur 
at an average rate of 3.0 per 459,361 sibling pairs
Allele sharing between individuals
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Allele sharing in databases
•  Original FBI dataset’s mischaracterization 
rate for 3-person mixtures (3.39%) is more 
than two σ above the average observed in 
five sets of randomized individuals
•  Original FBI dataset has more shared allele 
counts above 19 than five sets of 
randomized individuals (3 vs. an average of 
1.4)
Sources of ambiguity in STR 
interpretation
• Degradation
• Allelic dropout
• False peaks
• Mixtures
• Accounting for relatives
• Threshold issues -- marginal 
samples
Where do peak height thresholds 
come from (originally)?
• Applied Biosystems validation study of 1998
• Wallin et al., 1998, “TWGDAM validation of the 
AmpFISTR blue PCR Amplification kit for forensic 
casework analysis.” JFS 43:854-870.
Where do peak height thresholds 
come from (originally)?
Where do peak height thresholds 
come from?
• “Conservative” thresholds established 
during validation studies
• Eliminate noise (even at the cost of 
eliminating signal)
• Can arbitrarily remove legitimate signal
• Contributions to noise vary over time (e.g. 
polymer and capillary age/condition)
• Analytical chemists use LOD and LOQ
Signal Measure
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Many opportunities to measure baseline
Measurement of baseline in 
control samples:
• Negative controls: 5,932 data collection 
points (DCPs) per run (σ = 131 DCPs)
• Reagent blanks: 5,946 DCPs per run (σ = 87 
DCPs)
• Positive controls: 2,415 DCP per run (σ = 
198 DCPs)
Measurement of baseline in 
control samples:
•  Negative controls: 5,932 data collection 
points (DCPs) per run (σ = 131 DCPs)
• Reagent blanks: 5,946 DCPs per run (σ = 87 
DCPs)
• Positive controls: 2,415 DCP per run (σ = 
198 DCPs)
• DCP regions corresponding to size standards 
and 9947A peaks (plus and minus 55 DCPs 
to account for stutter in positive controls) 
were masked in all colors
RFU levels at all non-masked data 
collection points
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Variation in baseline noise levels
Positive Control  µb σb µb + 3σb µb + 10σb 
 Maximum  6.7 6.9 27.4 75.7 
 Average  5.0 3.7 16.1 42.0 
 Minimum 3.7 2.4 10.9 27.7 
      
Negative Control  µb σb µb + 3σb µb + 10σb 
 Maximum  13.4 13.2 53.0 145.4 
 Average  5.4 3.9 17.1 44.4 
 Minimum 4.0 2.6 11.8 30.0 
      
Reagent Blank  µb σb µb + 3σb µb + 10σb 
 Maximum  6.5 11.0 39.5 116.5 
 Average  5.3 4.0 17.3 45.3 
 Minimum 4.0 2.6 11.8 30.0 
All three controls 
averaged  µb σb µb + 3σb µb + 10σb 
 Maximum 7.1 7.3 29.0 80.1 
 Average 5.2 3.9 16.9 44.2 
 Minimum 3.9 2.5 11.4 28.9 
 
Average ( b) and standard deviation (⌠b) values with corresponding 
LODs and LOQs from positive, negative and reagent blank controls in 
50 different runs.  BatchExtract: ftp://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/forensics/
Doesn’t someone either match or not?
Lines in the sand: a two-person mix?
Two reference samples in a 1:10 ratio (male:female).  Three different 
thresholds are shown: 150 RFU (red); LOQ at 77 RFU (blue); and LOD 
at 29 RFU (green).
Vaginal Swab—male fraction (showing defendant’s profile)
Profile of second man (could he also be a contributor?)
Vaginal swab—close examination of electronic data shows 
evidence of second profile
Could second man be the source?
Observer effects, aka 
expectation effects
• --the tendency to interpret data in a 
manner consistent with expectations or 
prior theories (sometimes called “examiner 
bias”)
• Most influential when:
–Data being evaluated are ambiguous or 
subject to alternate interpretations
–Analyst is motivated to find a particular 
result
Context and Expectations 
Influence Interpretation of Data
Context and Expectations 
Influence Interpretation of Data
Context and Expectations 
Influence Interpretation of Data
Context and Expectations 
Influence Interpretation of Data



Analyst often have strong 
expectations about the data
DNA Lab Notes (Commonwealth v. Davis)
– “I asked how they got their suspect.  He is a 
convicted rapist and the MO matches the 
former rape…The suspect was recently 
released from prison and works in the same 
building as the victim…She was afraid of 
him.  Also his demeanor was suspicious 
when they brought him in for 
questioning…He also fits the general 
description of the man witnesses saw 
leaving the area on the night they think she 
died…So, I said, you basically have nothing 
to connect him directly with the murder 
(unless we find his DNA).  He said yes.”
Analyst often have strong 
expectations about the data
DNA Lab Notes
– “Suspect-known crip gang member--
keeps ‘skating’ on charges-never 
serves time.  This robbery he gets hit 
in head with bar stool--left blood trail.  
Miller [deputy DA] wants to connect 
this guy to scene w/DNA …”
– “Death penalty case!  Need to 
eliminate Item #57 [name of 
individual] as a possible suspect”
Analysts’ expectations may lead 
them to:
• Resolve ambiguous data in a manner 
consistent with expectations
• Miss or disregard evidence of problems
• Miss or disregard alternative interpretations of 
the data
• Thereby undermining the scientific validity of 
conclusions
– See, Risinger, Saks, Thompson, & Rosenthal, 
The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer 
Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of 
Expectation and Suggestion. 93 California Law 
Review 1 (2002).

FBI’s Explanation of Mayfield Error
• “Confirmation Bias”
• “[B]ecause the initial examiner was a 
highly respected supervisor with many 
years of experience, it was concluded 
that subsequent examinations were 
incomplete and inaccurate. To disagree 
was not an expected response.” 
– Robert B. Stacey, A report on the erroneous 
fingerprint individualization in the Madrid Train 
Bombing Case.  54 J.Forensic Identification 706 
(2004). 
– See, Thompson & Cole, Lessons from the 
Brandon Mayfield Case.  The Champion, April 
2005
What is LCN?
• DNA profiling performed at or beneath 
the stochastic threshold
• Typically less than 0.5 ng of DNA 
template
• Typically involves modifications of the 
testing methodology (e.g. increased 
polymerase; additional rounds of 
amplification; skipping quantitation)
• Consensus profiles
Applied Biosystems SGM Plus User’s 
Manual p.1-14
“The PCR amplification parameters have been 
optimized to produce similar peak heights within 
and between loci. The peak height generated at a 
locus for a heterozygous individual should be 
similar between the two alleles. The kit is also 
designed to generate similar peak heights 
between loci labeled with the same dye so that 
each locus will have approximately the same 
sensitivity.”
Applied Biosystems SGM Plus User’s Manual p.1-13
What is LCN?
• DNA profiling performed at or beneath 
the stochastic threshold
• Typically less than 0.5 ng of DNA 
template
• Typically involves modifications of the 
testing methodology (e.g. increased 
polymerase; additional rounds of 
amplification; skipping quantitation)
• Consensus profiles
Stochastic effects
• Ultimately due to poor statistical sampling 
of underlying template
• The four horsemen of stochasticism
–Exaggerated stutter
–Exaggerated peak height imbalance (0 
to 100%)
–Allelic drop-out (extreme peak height 
imbalance)
–Allelic drop-in (contamination)
Stochastic sampling effects
Stochastic effects
• Ultimately due to poor statistical sampling 
of underlying template
• The four horsemen of stochasticism
–Exaggerated stutter (up to 50%)
–Exaggerated peak height imbalance (0 
to 100%)
–Allelic drop-out (extreme peak height 
imbalance)
–Allelic drop-in (contamination)


How helpful is quantitation?
• Optimum amount of template: 0.5 to 
2.0 ng
• 6 to 7 pg of DNA in each diploid 
human cell
• In a mixed sample containing 0.5 ng 
of template, less than 0.5 ng comes 
from each contributor


Consensus profiles
• Alleles are not reported unless they are 
seen in at least two runs
• Considering two runs serves as a 
safeguard against allelic drop-in 
(contamination)
• Considering three or more runs begins 
to safeguard against drop-out
• If a sample is being split four or more 
times, shouldn’t conventional tests be 
done?
Runs used 
to make 
consensus D3 vWA D16 D2 D8 D21 D18 D19 THO1 FGA
1+2+3
16 
17 17 10 13 20 10 13 28 30
12 13 
14
15 9.3 23 24
1+2
16 
17 17 13 20 10 13 30
12 13 
14
15
1+3
16 
17 13 20 10 13 30
13 14 
15
2+3
16 
17 10 13 20 10 13 28 30
13 14 
15 9.3 23 24
Consensus profiles
Sources of ambiguity in STR 
interpretation
• Degradation
• Allelic dropout
• False peaks
• Mixtures
• Accounting for relatives
• Threshold issues -- marginal 
samples
Opportunities for subjective 
interpretation?
Can “Tom” be excluded?
Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
Opportunities for subjective 
interpretation?
Can “Tom” be excluded?
Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
No -- the additional alleles at D3 and FGA 
are “technical artifacts.”
Opportunities for subjective 
interpretation?
Can “Dick” be excluded?
Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
Dick 12, 17 15, 17 20, 25
Opportunities for subjective 
interpretation?
Can “Dick” be excluded?
Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
Dick 12, 17 15, 17 20, 25
No -- stochastic effects explain peak height 
disparity in D3; blob in FGA masks 20 allele.
Opportunities for subjective 
interpretation?
Can “Harry” be excluded?
Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
Dick 12, 17 15, 17 20, 25
Harry 14, 17 15, 17 20, 25
No -- the 14 allele at D3 may be missing due to 
“allelic drop out”; FGA blob masks the 20 allele.
Opportunities for subjective 
interpretation?
Can “Sally” be excluded?
Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
Dick 12, 17 15, 17 20, 25
Harry 14, 17 15, 17 20, 25
Sally 12, 17 15, 15 20, 22
No -- there must be a second contributor; 
degradation explains the “missing” FGA allele.
Subjective interpretation and 
statistics
Frequency estimates (for Tom):
p2 x     2pq      x       p2
Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
Dick 12, 17 15, 17 20, 25
Harry 14, 17 15, 17 20, 25
Sally 12, 17 15, 15 20, 22
Partial Profile Statistics


Familial searching
• Database search yields a close but imperfect 
DNA match
• Can suggest a relative is the true perpetrator
• Great Britain performs them routinely
• Reluctance to perform them in US since 1992 
NRC report
• Current CODIS software cannot perform 
effective searches
Three approaches to familial 
searches
• Search for rare alleles (inefficient)
• Count matching alleles (arbitrary)
• Likelihood ratios with kinship analyses
Pair-wise similarity distributions
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Randomized Individuals
Simulated Cousins
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Is the true DNA match a relative or a 
random individual?
• Given a closely matching profile, who is 
more likely to match, a relative or a 
randomly chosen, unrelated individual?
• Use a likelihood ratio
( )
)|(
|
randomEP
relativeEPLR =
Is the true DNA match a relative or a 
random individual?
• What is the likelihood that a relative of a 
single initial suspect would match the evidence 
sample perfectly?
• What is the likelihood that a single randomly 
chosen, unrelated individual would match the 
evidence sample perfectly?
( )
)|(
|
randomEP
relativeEPLR =
Probabilities of siblings matching at 
0, 1 or 2 alleles
HF = 1 for homozygous loci and 2 for heterozygous loci; 
Pa is the frequency of the allele shared by the evidence 
sample and the individual in a database.
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Probabilities of parent/child 
matching at 0, 1 or 2 alleles
HF = 1 for homozygous loci and 2 for heterozygous loci; 
Pa is the frequency of the allele shared by the evidence 
sample and the individual in a database.
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Other familial relationships
Cousins:
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aunt/uncle-nephew-
neice;half-sibings:
HF = 1 for homozygous loci and 2 for heterozygous loci; 
Pa is the frequency of the allele shared by the evidence 
sample and the individual in a database.
Familial search experiment
• Randomly pick related pair or unrelated pair 
from a synthetic database
• Choose one profile to be evidence and one 
profile to be initial suspect
• Test hypothesis:
– H0: A relative is the source of the evidence
– HA: An unrelated person is the source of the      
evidence
Paoletti, D., Doom, T., Raymer, M. and Krane, D.  2006.  Assessing 
the implications for close relatives in the event of similar but non-
matching DNA profiles.  Jurimetrics, 46:161-175.
Hypothesis testing using an LR 
threshold of 1 with prior odds of 1
True state
Evidence 
from Unrelated
individual
Evidence 
from sibling
Decision Evidence 
from 
unrelated 
individual
~ 98%
[Correct decision]
~4%
[Type II error;
false negative]
Evidence 
from 
sibling
~ 2%
[Type I error;
false positive]
~ 96%
[Correct 
decision]
Is the true DNA match a relative or a 
random individual?
• What is the likelihood that a close relative of a 
single initial suspect would match the evidence 
sample perfectly?
• What is the likelihood that a single randomly 
chosen, unrelated individual would match the 
evidence sample perfectly?
 
LR =
P E | relative( )
P(E | random)
Is the true DNA match a relative or a 
random individual?
• What is the likelihood that the source of the 
evidence sample was a relative of an initial 
suspect?
Prior odds:
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )randomPrandomEPsibPsibEP
sibPsibEPEsibP
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=
||
||
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Is the true DNA match a relative or a 
random individual?
• This more difficult question is ultimately 
governed by two considerations:
– What is the size of the alternative suspect 
pool?
– What is an acceptable rate of false 
positives?
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sibEPLR =
Pair-wise similarity distributions
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III:  What can go wrong and where 
problems might occur
Victorian Coroner’s inquest into the 
death of Jaidyn Leskie
• Toddler disappears in bizarre 
circumstances: found dead 
six months later
• Mother’s boy friend is tried 
and acquitted.
• Unknown female profile on 
clothing.
• Cold hit to a rape victim.
• RMP: 1 in 227 million.
• Lab claims “adventitious 
match.”
Victorian Coroner’s inquest into the 
death of Jaidyn Leskie
• Condom with rape victim’s 
DNA was processed in the 
same lab 1 or 2 days prior to 
Leskie samples.
• Additional tests find matches 
at 5 to 7 more loci.
• Review of electronic data 
reveals low level 
contributions at even more 
loci.
• Degradation study further 
suggests contamination.
Degradation, inhibition
• When biological samples are exposed to adverse 
environmental conditions, they can become degraded
– Warm, moist, sunlight, time
• Degradation breaks the DNA at random
• Larger amplified regions are affected first
• Classic ‘ski-slope’ electropherogram
• Degradation and inhibition are unusual and noteworthy.  
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Degradation, inhibition
The Leskie Inquest, a practical application
• Undegraded samples can 
have “ski-slopes” too.
• How negative does a 
slope have to be to an 
indication of degradation?
• Experience, training and 
expertise.
• Positive controls should 
not be degraded.
Degradation, inhibition
The Leskie Inquest
• DNA profiles in a rape 
and a murder 
investigation match.
• Everyone agrees that the 
murder samples are 
degraded.
• If the rape sample is 
degraded, it could have 
contaminated the murder 
samples.
• Is the rape sample 
degraded?
Degradation, inhibition
The Leskie Inquest
Victorian Coroner’s inquest into the 
death of Jaidyn Leskie
“8. During the conduct of the 
preliminary investigation 
(before it was decided to 
undertake an inquest) the 
female DNA allegedly taken 
from the bib that was 
discovered with the body 
was matched with a DNA 
profile in the Victorian 
Police Forensic Science 
database.  This profile was 
from a rape victim who was 
subsequently found to be 
unrelated to the Leskie 
case.”
Victorian Coroner’s inquest into the 
death of Jaidyn Leskie
“8. The match to the bib 
occurred as a result of 
contamination in the 
laboratory and was not an 
adventitious match.  The 
samples from the two 
cases were examined by 
the same scientist within a 
close time frame.”
www.bioforensics.com/articles/
Leskie_decision.pdf
The science of DNA profiling is 
sound.
But, not all of DNA profiling is 
science.
This is especially true in situations 
involving: small amounts of starting 
material, mixtures, relatives, and 
analyst judgment calls.
Steps in Preparing a DNA Case
• Obtain all lab reports
• Red flags: 
–unfamiliar techniques
–equivocal matches (profile “similar but 
cannot be definitively included nor 
excluded”); 
– contingent matches (profile included 
“if…” or “but…”; 
–partial/incomplete profiles; 
–mixtures; 
–unusually modest statistics; no 
statistics; likelihood ratios
Steps in Preparing a DNA Case
• Initial discovery
–Full history of all samples from 
collection to current disposition
–Complete DNA lab notes (bench notes)
–Electronic data
–Analysts’ credentials, proficiency test 
record
–Lab’s incidence reports; unexpected 
event files; accreditation files 
• Obtain expert assistance for initial review
Steps in Preparing a DNA Case
• Initial evaluation of case 
– Identify possible lines of attack
– Additional/alternative experts needed
– Needs for follow-up discovery—e.g., 
validation; proficiency problems; error 
problems
• Consider advisability of additional testing
– Replications; untested items; other 
experiments
• Final evaluation of strategy
– Consider ways to blunt/deflect prosecution 
(or defense) testimony
• Prepare exhibits, lines of examination, motions 
in limine; notices of objection, etc.
Resources
• Internet
– Forensic Bioinformatics Website: http://www.bioforensics.com/
– Applied Biosystems Website: http://www.appliedbiosystems.com/
(see human identity and forensics)
– STR base: http://www.cstl.nist.gov/biotech/strbase/ (very useful)
• Books
– ‘Forensic DNA Typing’ by John M. Butler (Academic Press)
• Scientists
– Larry Mueller (UC Irvine)
– Simon Ford (Lexigen, Inc. San Francisco, CA)
– William Shields (SUNY, Syracuse, NY)
– Mike Raymer and Travis Doom (Wright State, Dayton, OH)
– Marc Taylor (Technical Associates, Ventura, CA)
– Keith Inman (Forensic Analytical, Haywood, CA)
• Testing laboratories
– Technical Associates (Ventura, CA)
– Forensic Analytical (Haywood, CA)
• Other resources
– Forensic Bioinformatics (Dayton, OH)
